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Changes in the Law of Self-Defence? Drones, Imminence, 
and International Norm Dynamics 
 
This article assesses the evolution of the international law of the use of force, focusing on 
how the emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), influenced international norms 
regulating the right to self-defense. Drawing on constructivist International Relations 
research, we develop a socio-legal framework that emphasizes changes in the 
interpretation of the meaning of imminence, and investigate how these changes, counter-
terrorism, and the introduction of UAVs have contributed to the adoption of more relaxed 
standards for the use of force in self-defence. We argue that the Obama Administration 
engaged in a systematic effort to redefine imminence and that a significant numbers of 
states, including key powers such as China, India and the UK, have largely followed this 
model. This, we suggest, underlines both the ability of dominant states to shape the 
interpretation of international norms and the influence of strategic and technological 
developments on the meaning and interpretation of international law. 
 
Keywords: drones, imminence, international norms, international law, norm 
contestation, self-defence,.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2011, John Brennan,1 at the time Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism, outlined the US’ position on the use of force in international 
relations, in particular with regard to its anti-terrorism policy. Touching upon the 
question of when a country has the right to defend itself, Brennan made a potentially 
far-reaching comment: 
 
We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible 
understanding of “imminence” may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups, 
in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways 
that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts.2 
 
                                                          
1 John Brennan, ‘Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws’, Remarks of John Brennan 
at Harvard Law School, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-
o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an 
2 Brennan, ‘Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Law’.  
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This article takes as its starting point Brennan’s assumption about the changing 
nature of ‘imminence’ and considers whether a new understanding of ‘imminence’ - 
one based on the US definition of the concept – is, in fact, emerging in international 
relations. More specifically, our aim is to ascertain the claim that the emergence of 
drones has led international society to internalize a ‘new’ understanding of the right to 
self-defence, on the basis of an expanded notion of imminence. This, we hope, will help 
both international lawyers and International Relations (IR) scholars to better 
understand states’ current position in relation to the right of self-defence and how 
changes in state practice and opinio juris have influenced the evolution of the 
international law that regulates it.3   
Confirming the widespread view that there has been a transition, set in motion by 
the Bush Administration after 9/11, towards a more relaxed standard understanding of 
the law of self-defence,4 we offer two interrelated arguments that qualify this view in 
important respects. Firstly, at the theoretical level, we suggest that the evolution of the 
international law of self-defence has been a result of changes in the interpretation of the 
temporal conditions under which the right to self-defence can be legally exercised 
rather than a modification of the law itself. To examine different interpretations of 
                                                          
3 Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: international crisis and the rule of law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), p. 26. 
4 See for example, Noura Erakat, ‘New Imminence in the Time of Obama: The Impact of Targeted Killings 
on the Law of Self-defence’, Arizona Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2014, pp. 195-248. Peter Dombrowski and 
Rodger A. Payne, ‘The Emerging Consensus of Preventive War, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 
48, No. 2, 2006, pp. 115-36.  Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim 
of Preemptive Self-defence’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, 2006, pp. 525-50. Kerstin Fisk 
and Jennifer Ramos, ‘Actions speak louder than words: preventive self-defence as a cascading norm,’ 
International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, pp.  163-85. Michael Reisman and Andrea 
Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-defence’, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 100, 2006, pp. 525-50. 
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international law, the article turns to the discipline of International Relations. We 
develop a constructivist approach that makes the interpretation of norms accountable, 
by focusing on the way states enact specific meanings of a norm in a given context. 
This allows us to go beyond existing accounts of the evolution of the international law 
of self-defence, showing how states strategically contest, promote, and adopt specific 
meanings of the law as a response to technological and political developments.   
Secondly, at the empirical level, we suggest that only under the Obama 
Administration, the US has made a deliberate and explicit effort to redefine the 
meaning of the concept of imminence. We argue that this redefined concept of 
imminence has played a prominent role in the administration’s justification of counter-
terrorism operations, specifically in the context of drone strikes, and show that several 
countries, including, but not limited to US allies, have embraced this expanded notion 
of imminence when confronting terrorists and other non-state actors. These findings 
add further evidence to the claim that the dominant schemes for the interpretation of 
international law are shaped and forged by the strongest states, ‘as it is their practice 
that is most persuasive in resolving conflicts over the meaning of the rules.’5  
In order to advance our arguments, we proceed in four steps. The first section 
provides a brief overview of the current dynamics in the international law of self-
defence. We consider under what conditions the law of self-defence can change and 
suggest that much of the currently debated changes concern the evolution of the 
interpretation of the law. To get to grips, methodologically, with these changes, the 
                                                          
5 Ian Hurd, How to do things with International Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 52. See also, 
Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
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second section develops an interdisciplinary socio-legal framework for the study of the 
evolution of the international law of self-defence. Drawing on the constructivist 
framework of Antje Wiener,6 we conceptualize the norm of self-defence as a dynamic 
structure of meaning-in-use that is shaped, contested and transformed by social and 
communicative practices. From here, we construct a number of markers of change, 
criteria which will allow us to systematically track the evolution and diffusion of the 
meaning of imminence. The third section considers in detail the conceptual evolution 
of imminence in American foreign policy. Here, the aim is to establish a precise 
account of what exactly ‘imminence’ meant to the Obama Administration, and how 
this meaning differed from its predecessors. Having established the US position on 
‘imminence’, the fourth section investigates whether international society7 has adopted 
this position. To do so, we look in detail at a number of critical actors’ foreign policies 
and military strategies, including both US key allies (Australia, France, Israel and the 
UK) and a number of non-Western powers (Brazil, China, India and Russia). We 
deliberately select a large sample consisting of ideologically diverse actors, as this will 
not only allow us to find out whether a particular meaning is unique to a particular 
group of actors, or common to many in international society, but also to link causes 
such as threat level, regional security situation, identity and great power status to 
                                                          
6 Antje Wiener, ‘Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international relations’, 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2009, pp. 175-93.  
7 Most lawyers and politicians tend use the term ‘international community’ instead. However, for political 
scientists, ‘community’ and ‘society’ represent two different concepts. Based on the Weberian distinction 
between Gesellschaft (society) and Gemeinschaft (community), society is concerned with the norms and 
rules that structure interaction within large social groups, while community focuses on affection and the 
feeling of belonging together. For an excellent discussion of the society/community distinction in IR, see 
Barry Buzan, From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of 
Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 108-118. We will use the term (and 
concept) ‘international society’ in order to signify that we are dealing with processes and changes that 
pertain to patterns of rational interaction structures, not to feelings about identity and belonging.   
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outcomes. We conclude by providing some reflections on international norm dynamics 
that highlight the link between great power status, technology and the evolution of 
norms.  
 
Current Issues and Dynamics in the International Law Guiding 
Self-Defence  
 
Constraining the use (and abuse) of force is an integral part of the solution to the social 
order problem, and all international societies have contained certain shared 
understandings about how to regulate the use of large-scale violence among its 
members. Here, international society is no different to its domestic counterpart. As 
Hedley Bull argued in his seminal study of order in world politics, ‘all societies seek to 
ensure that life will be in some measure secure against violence resulting in death or 
bodily harm’.8 This section looks at the legal debates surrounding the rules regulating 
use of force in contemporary international society. The aim here is not to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of these debates, but to establish current themes, provide an 
understanding of the rules, and consider how they have evolved.  
In the post-1945 global normative order, the basic shared understandings governing 
the use of force among states are laid down in the UN Charter. According to Jackson,9 
Article 2 of the UN Charter contains ‘the most important procedural norm – grundnorm 
– of the global covenant’. Chief among them is Article 2(4), which stipulates the most 
                                                          
8 Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Palgrave, 1977), p. 4.  
9 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 16-19. 
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important rule on resort to force: 10 ‘All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state’. The fundamental status of Article 2(4), and its importance 
for the functioning and moral integrity of the international public order, is illustrated 
through its jus cogens status, which renders it non-derogable and universally binding 
all states.11   
There are only two express exceptions to this general prohibition. According to 
Chapter VII, the Security Council can authorise the use of force to restore international 
peace and security. The other exception, and the only case in which the right to engage 
in military force remains at the disposal of the sovereign state, is the ‘inherent’ right to 
self-defence defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter:  
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. 
 
The restrictions set out in this article, however, have come under intense pressure 
during recent years. The two main legal debates in this context surround whether or 
not non-state actors can mount an ‘armed attack;’ and the temporal requirements 
                                                          
10 See, Thomas, M Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)?’ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64, No. 4, 
1970, p. 809. Note that with a few minor exceptions, such as firing a bullet across a boundary or across a 
bow of a ship, Article 2(4) is generally read as prohibiting all uses of force. See, Mary Ellen O'Connell, 
‘Remarks: The Resort to Drones under International Law’, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 
Vol 39, No. 4, 2011, p. 589. 
11 On the jus cogens status of the prohibition on the use of force, see Sondre Torp Helmersen, ‘The 
Prohibition of the Use of Force as Jus Cogens: Explaining Apparent Derogations’, Netherlands 
International Law Review Vol. 61, No. 2, 2014, pp. 167–93; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 36-66.  
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surrounding self-defence, that is whether states can act against attacks which have yet 
to occur.12  
Armed attack and non-state actors 
 
In at least three separate decisions, the International Court of Justice made clear that 
the attack must be attributable to a state for the exercise of self-defence on that state’s 
territory to be lawful.13 In the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, for 
example, the Court concluded that Uganda could not justify the use of self-defence, 
given that no sufficient evidence existed that Congo was responsible for the attacks by 
non-state actor groups located in Congo against Uganda.14  The ICJ’s restrictive reading 
of self-defence has been challenged more recently, suggesting that the attributability of 
armed attack by non-state actors is no longer a necessary condition for the right to use 
force in self-defence.15 This claim is typically advanced in one of three ways (or a 
combination thereof).  
The first is to cite the diverging opinions of different ICJ judges with regard to the 
case law on the matter. Criticising the ICJ’s Wall judgement, for example, Judge 
Higgins noted that ‘there is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus 
                                                          
12 In the sense that this debate predates the UN Charter, it also relates to the question whether Article 51 is 
exhaustive, that is whether it supplanted or simply complemented a customary international law right 
for states to act in self-defence before an armed attack occurs. See James Mulcahy and Charles Mahony, 
‘Anticipatory Self-Defence: A Discussion of International Law,’ Hanse Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2006), p. 
233 
13 Those decisions include the ICJ judgements in the Nicaragua case, I.C.J, 1986, Rep. 14, para 195; the Wall 
case, I.C.J., 2004, Rep. 136, para 139; and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, I.C.J., 2005, Rep. 
168, para. 146-147. 
14 Ibid. the Wall. 
15 Kimberley Trapp, ‘Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed Attack?’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of 
Force in International Law, ed. Marc Weller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 696. 
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stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is made by a State’.16 
The second is to show that the ICJ’s assertions do not rule out the right to self-defence 
in cases in which the attack was committed by a non-state actor; an argument made by 
Michael Wood17 and Kimberley Trapp.18 The third is to point towards the changed 
practice of states and international organizations. Relevant examples include the UN 
Security Council Resolutions that legitimised the US intervention in Afghanistan that 
followed the September 11 attacks. In this context, Michael Scharf has argued that 
while initially the claim made by the United State after 9/11 was rejected, the 2015 ISIS 
attacks in Syria triggered a ‘Grotian moment’ in which the UN and the international 
community recognised the right to respond to attacks by non-state actors and, hence, 
non-state actors ability to mount ‘armed attack.’19 In sum, and whichever strategy one 
pursues, there now seems to be a more expansionist reading affirming the existence of 
a right to respond to an armed attack by non-state actors with a use of force in foreign 
territory,20 while the precise parameters of the right is still being worked out in 
international practice.21  
 
 
 
                                                          
16Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory case’, 
p. 215. For similar opinions see also, Pieter Kooijmans p. 230; Thomas Buergenthal p. 242.  
17  Michael Wood, in Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States In Self-Defence (Chatham House 
Principles) (Chatham House, 2005) Available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108106, p. 30.  
18 Kimberley N. Trapp, ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence Against 
Non-State Terrorist Actors’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 56, No. 1, 2007, p 145. 
19 Michael P. Scharf, ‘How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law,’ Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 48 (2016), pp. 1-54. 
20 Steenberghe, ‘The Law of Self-Defence and the New Argumentative Landscape, pp. 46-48.  
21 Trapp, ‘Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed Attack?’ p. 696.  
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Anticipatory self-defence and imminent threats 
The second area of the law of self-defence that has remained unsettled in recent years 
concerns the conditions, in particular the temporal conditions, for the exercise of the 
right. As Joe Boyle recently put it: ‘the settled part of the law is that a state suffering an 
attack of a certain threshold can take forceful measures in self-defence while that attack 
is going on,’ the use of force in anticipation of a more or less clear threat remains much 
more contentious.22 The ICJ has refused to provide any clarification on the matter. In 
the Corfu Channel case, the Court deemed that the readiness of British ships to use 
force was not unreasonable.23 As reported by Ruys, Waldock understood the Court’s 
opinion as a suggestion that a ‘strong probability of armed attack’ was sufficient to 
trigger self-defence.24  In the Nicaragua case, the Court stressed that the use of force was 
an instrument of last resort. This seemingly suggested a narrow view of the right of 
self-defence. In the ruling, however, the Court also stated that ‘the possible lawfulness 
of a response to the imminent threat of an armed attack which has not yet taken place 
has not been raised,’ and hence the Court expressed no opinion on the matter.25   The 
only case in which the Court seemed to deal with imminence is the Gabcikovo - 
Nagymaros Project case. The Court stated that ‘a “peril” appearing in the long-term 
might be held to be “imminent” as soon as it is established.’26 At a superficial reading, 
this statement seemed to point towards a much broader understanding of imminence, 
                                                          
22 Joe Boyle, ‘Making Sense of Self-Defence in the War on Terror’, Journal on the Use of Force and International 
Law Vol. 1, No. 1, 2014, p. 62.  
23 Corfu Channel Case, International Court of Justice, 9 April 1949, p. 30. 
24 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 52 of the UN Charter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), p. 262. 
25 See Militarv and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, par. 35. 
26 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1. C. J. Reports 1997, par. 54. 
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and this is how it was read by John Yoo.27 As several scholars point out, however, this 
interpretation is disingenuous. The case concerned environmental damage that cannot 
be reversed and excluded the issue of assessing timing and intentions.28 Confirming the 
Court’s unwillingness to engage with this issue, the Court used the statement provided 
in the Nicaragua case also in the more recent DRC v. Uganda case.29  
In the absence of a ruling from the ICJ, legal scholarship and state practices have 
flourished. Three main positions can be identified. 30 The first view is a ‘restrictionist’ 
one. According to this view, states only have a right to self-defence if the attack has 
occurred.31 Other scholars - the ‘inherent right school’ - suggest that Article 51 of the 
UN Charter did not supplant a pre-existing ‘inherent’ right of self-defence. These 
scholars typically rely on the so-called Caroline criteria, which posit that the use of force 
is legitimate only in situations in which the threat ‘is instant, overwhelming and 
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.’32 Michael N. Schmitt 
argued in 2003 that these criteria had become universally accepted.33 The possibility of 
                                                          
27 John Yoo, ‘Using Force,’ University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (2004), pp. 752.  
28 Noam Lubell, ‘The Problem of imminence in an uncertain world,’ in Marc Weller (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 703 and 
Noura Erakat, ‘New imminence,’ p. 209. 
29 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, par. 143 
30 These three schools can be found in Avery Plaw and Joao Franco Reis, ‘The Contemporary Practice of 
Self- The Contemporary Practice of Self-Defense: Evolving Toward the Use of Preeemptive or Preventive 
Force?’, in Preventive force: Drones, targeted killing, and the transformation of contemporary warfare, eds. 
Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer Ramos (New York: New York University Press, 2016), pp.230 
31 Mulcahy and Mahony, ‘Anticipatory Self-Defence,' p. 235. See also, Mary Ellen O'Connell, ‘Remarks: The 
Resort to Drones under International Law Sutton Colloquium Articles’, Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy Vo. 39, No. 4, 2011, p. 599. Some scholars debate how long after the attack self-defence can 
occur, but they agree that it must occur afterwards. See Jan Kittrick and Yoram Dinstein in Plaw and 
Reis, ‘The contemporary practice of self-defence,’ p. 232. 
32 Neta Crawford, ‘The Justice of Preemption and Preventive War Doctrines,’ In: Mark Evans (Ed.), Just 
War Theory: a Reappraisal (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 29. 
33 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Preemptive strategies in international law,’ Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 
24 (2003), p.530. In addition, these scholars could also rely on the defence of the legality of anticipatory 
self-defence provided by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and on ICJ Judge Caroline Higgins’s defence of the 
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preventive use of force gained traction after 9/1134 with the development of what Plaw 
and Reis define the ‘preventive force school’ and the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’, which 
was introduced through a series of speeches and established officially in the 2002 
National Security Strategy (NSS). On the 17th of September 2001, Bush affirmed that new 
US approach would stress ‘preemption of future attacks.’35 In the 2002 State of the 
Union address, Bush elaborated that - due to the nature of the enemy - waiting for an 
attack to occur had become untenable; a point reaffirmed in at the West Point 
graduation speech. The NSS confirmed anticipation as the cornerstone of America’s 
posture. Addressing the legal community the NSS made the bold claim that 
international law had been recognizing ‘for centuries’ states’ right of pre-emptive self-
defence. Imminence, however, had to be made compatible with the new environment.36 
Far from updating the concept of imminence, however, the Bush Administration did 
not play a role in the evolution of the concept. The NSS blurred the key distinction 
between pre-emption and prevention,37 using the two terms interchangeably.38 In the 
letter introducing the NSS, Bush also stated that the US government was entitled to act 
                                                                                                                                                                          
existence of an ‘inherent’ right of anticipatory self-defence. See Plaw and Reis, ‘The Contemporary 
Practice,’ p. 233. 
34 Debates regarding imminence had appeared even before 9/11 with author Michael Walzer questioning 
the understanding of imminence in purely temporal terms in his seminal book on just war theory. See 
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 2000 [1977]), p. 81. Debates had also 
emerged surrounding two anticipatory measures taken by the Israeli government: the pre-emptive attack 
in the Six Days War and the preventive strike on Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq. The two actions were 
received differently by the international society with the latter receiving criticism for the less imminent 
and more speculative nature of the threat. See House of Commons (HoC), ‘Foreign Policy Aspects of the 
War against Terrorism,’ Foreign Affairs Committee. Second Report of the Session 2002-2003. Available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/196/196.pdf> [Accessed 3 
February 2017], p. 156  
35 Bob Woodward, Bush at war (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 97. 
36 US Government, The National Security Strategy, September 2002, available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> [Accessed 28 October 2015], p. 15 
37 Jack Levy, ‘Preventive war and Democratic Politics,’ International Studies Quarterly, 52:1 (2008), p. 4. 
38 US Government, The National Security Strategy, p. 15. 
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against ‘emerging threats…before they are fully formed,’39 thus suggesting a right to 
act against future as well as imminent threats. As Ruys concluded, the document 
‘could more accurately be described as an endorsement of “preventive” self-defense 
vis-a-vis “non-imminent” threats.’40  
Several scholars were quick to (wrongly) identify an emerging consensus 
surrounding the Bush Administration’s position.41 Whilst several official documents 
from international organizations seemed to support more expansive notions of self-
defence,42 they rejected the notion of a preventive use of force, in support of an UN 
Security Council authorised action against imminent threats.43 In other words, the 
rejection of the preventive position brought forward by the Bush Administration 
seemed to consolidate a consensus surrounding the legality of self-defence against 
imminent threats44 - contrary to pre-9/11 positions (in state practice and scholarship), 
which favoured a restrictionist interpretation. 45 Much of the recent scholarship on the 
topic, then, has focused on establishing both temporal conditions as well as identifying 
                                                          
39 NSS 2002, p. 2. 
40 Ruys, Armed Attack, p. 310. 
41 See Peter Dombrowski and Rodger A. Payne, ‘The Emerging Consensus of Preventive War, Survival: 
Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2006, pp. 115-36, Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, ‘The 
Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-defence’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, 
2006, pp. 525-50.  
42 These included: the NATO Prague Summit Declaration of 2002, the OSCE Strategy to address threats to 
security and stability in the Twenty-first century of 2003, the European Security Strategy of 2003, and the 
African Union’s Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy in 2004, the UN 
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), and Secretary General Kofi Anna’s report 
‘In Larger Freedom’ (2005). See Ruys, Armed Attack, p. 307. 
43 See for example, High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A more Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility (2004), par 189-193 < 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf> [Accessed 1 may 2018]. 
44 Raphael van Steenberghe, ‘The Law of Self-Defence and the New Argumentative Landscape on the 
Expansionists’ Side’, Leiden Journal of International Law Vol. 29, No. 1, 2016, p53. 
45 Ruys, ‘Armed Attack,’ p. 308. 
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substantive criteria for assessing imminent threats.46 There are, of course, obvious 
limitations to such endeavours, as judgement of evidence always includes a measure of 
subjectivity and ‘it is virtually impossible to define an objective watertight definition of 
proof of future attack’.47  The precise legal basis of such criteria is therefore seldom 
clear. But it is on imminence and on the (re)definitions of imminence that the new 
battle lines - between restrictionist and counter-restrictionist arguments - have been 
drawn. And it is in this context that – as we will argue below – the Obama 
Administration has played a key role in the (re)interpretation of imminence.  
 
Drones, international law and self-defence 
The intensity and controversial nature of these debates has increased partially in 
response to the expanded use of drones and targeted killings in the fight against 
terrorism. Various positions have emerged regarding the novelty of drones, the legality 
of drones and their use in self-defence, and the legality (and legal frameworks 
applicable to) targeted killings. For some drones do not pose novel legal problems.48  
As Michael Schmitt argues, ‘there are very few legal issues unique to UCAS’ 
                                                          
46 See, for example. Dapo Akande and Thomas Liefländer, ‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and 
Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense’, The American Journal of International Law Vol. 107, No. 3, 2013, 
pp. 563–70; Nico Schrijver and Larissa van den Herik, ‘Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-
Terrorism and International law’, in Counter-terrorism strategies in a fragmented international legal 
order: Meeting the challenges, eds. Larissa J. van den Herik and Nico Schrijver (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), pp. 706–26; T. D. Gill, ‘The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence: Anticipation, 
Pre-emption, Prevention and Immediacy’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law Vol. 11, No. 3, 2006, pp. 361–
69.  
47 Noam Lubell, ‘The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of 
Force in International Law, ed. Marc Weller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 718. 
48 Schmitt, ‘Unmanned combat aircraft systems and international humanitarian law,’ and Daphne Eviatar, 
‘Drones and the Law: why we do not need a new legal framework for targeted killing,’ in Preventive 
force: Drones, targeted killing, and the transformation of contemporary warfare, eds. Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer 
Ramos (New York: New York University Press, 2016)  
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[Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems].49 Others have argued that drones present a 
number of significant challenges to the current international legal structure,50 
stemming inter alia from the nature of drones as platforms/technologies for the use of 
force,51 and from the fact that targeted killing as currently carried out by the United 
States and other countries sit uncomfortably between a ‘hostilities paradigm’ and a 
‘law enforcement’ paradigm.52  
One of the key problems is that targeted killings, as Special Rapporteur Philip 
Alston wrote in 2010, have tended to blur distinctions between legal frameworks, that 
is between international human rights and international humanitarian law.53 Targeted 
killings are less controversial when carried out in the context of an armed conflict. As 
Bachmann put it:  
 
Any deliberate targeting of designated individuals has to comply with the necessary legal 
safeguards of humanitarian law in order to be legitimate: namely compliance with the 
fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, the principles of military necessity, 
distinction and proportionality.54 
 
                                                          
49 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Unmanned combat aircraft systems and international humanitarian law: 
simplifying the benighted debate,’ Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 30 (2012), p. 596. 
50 Jordan Paust, ‘Remotely Piloted warfare as a challenge to the Jus ad bellum,’ in Marc Weller (Ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force and International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015). 
51 See Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, Drone Wars: transforming conflict, law, and policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015) and in particular Brad Allenby’s chapter ‘How to manage drones: 
transformative technologies, the evolving nature of conflict, and the inadequacy of the current systems of 
law.’ 
52 See the seminal volume Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008).  
53 Philip Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,’ 2010, 
< http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf>  [Accessed 1 
May 2019], p. 6. 
54 Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, ‘Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities,’ 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vo. 18, No. 2 (2018), p. 275. 
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Outside of armed conflict,55 targeted killing can be carried out following law 
enforcement procedures. The relevant legal framework here is that of international 
human rights law. This framework provides a much stricter set of requirements. As 
Melzer summarised, targeted killing in law enforcement is permissible only if ‘(a) aims 
at preventing an unlawful attack by the targeted person on human life; (b) is absolutely 
necessary for the achievement of this purpose; and (c) is the result of an operation 
which is planned, prepared, and conducted so as to minimize, to the greatest extent 
possible, the recourse to lethal force.’56 This position, however, is both controversial 
and does not reflect state practice which has adopted more relaxed criteria for action. It 
is in this context that several scholars have worked to develop new and innovative 
legal frameworks and criteria to regulate (and often defend) the practice of targeted 
killing.57  The intricacies of these frameworks are beyond the scope of the current 
article. What is clear is that within the scholarship (and within debates on drones and 
targeted killing), as well as within the broader debates surrounding self-defence, 
claims regarding the nature of self-defence and of imminence have played a prominent 
role.58  
                                                          
55 This issue is also connected to debate regarding the existence of international as opposed to ‘non-
international’ armed conflict. For this debate see: Christof Heyns, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,’ UN General Assembly, 2013 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/UN-Special-Rapporteur-Extrajudicial-
Christof-Heyns-Report-Drones.pdf> [Accessed 2 May 2018]. 
56 Melzer, Targeted Killing, p. 287.  
57 Claire Finkelstein, ‘Targeted killing as preemptive action,’ in Clare Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and 
Andrew Altman (Eds.), Targeted Killing: Law and morality in an asymmetrical world (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 
Amos Guiora, Legitimate targets (Oxford: OUP, 2013). 
58 This has also been highlighted by Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson’s call for increased transparency 
and for clarification regarding the meaning of imminence. See, Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, 28 February 2014 < https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Special-Rapporteur-Rapporteur-Emmerson-Drones-2014.pdf> [Accessed 1 May 
2018}, p. 19. 
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Analysing the Evolution of the Law of Self-Defence: A Socio-
Legal Approach 
 
The section above highlighted how norms surrounding the use of force have 
undergone an evolution. But how can norms regulating the use of force in international 
affairs change, if the same UN Charter paradigm still applies? The significant 
developments that have occurred with regard to anticipatory practice of self-defence 
over the past two decades or so have led to an interesting methodological debate 
among legal scholars about the conditions under which the law of self-defence may 
evolve.59 Methodological claims about the evolution of the law of self-defence are not 
always easy to discern, with many statements about the nature, status and relevance of 
practice blurring and overlapping. This is not the place here to review the entire 
debate. Instead, we want to briefly outline its main strands and then show how our 
own, sociological inspired approach sits within, and can contribute to, current 
discussions about the evolution of the law of self-defence.  
 
 
Methodological claims about the evolution of the law of self-defence 
 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to support a more expansionist reading of the 
right of self-defence is to suggest that customary international law has evolved through 
                                                          
59 See, for example, Olivier Corten, ‘The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of 
Force: A Methodological Debate’, European Journal of International Law Vo. 16, No. 5, 2005, pp. 803–22; 
Raphaël van Steenberghe, ‘State practice and the evolution of the law of self-defence: Clarifying the 
methodological debate’, Journal on the Use of Force and International Law Vol. 2, No. 1, 2015, pp. 81–96; Tom 
Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 52 of the UN Charter; Marie Aronsson, ‘Remote Law-Making? American 
Drone Strikes and the Development of Jus Ad Bellum’, Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 
Vol. 1, No. 2, 2014, pp. 285–297. 
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the emergence of new facts and realities. Starting from the pragmatic assumption that 
law must be able to effectively address the realities of current affairs, some 
commentators seem to presume that the emergence of new threats (e.g. terrorist groups 
and rogue regimes), and changed state practice in response to those threats, may lead 
to the evolution of the law of self-defence under customary international law.60 
Endorsing such a realist view, Plaw and Reis, for example, argue that is has become 
permissible to act in self-defence to prevent further attacks based on an analysis of 
state practice alone.61 From a jurisprudential perspective, however, such arguments are 
questionable for a variety of reasons. They confuse facts and realities with state practice 
linked to a specific aspect of international law; even if the two were successfully 
juxtaposed, the established view holds that state practice alone, in particular without 
any reference to opinio juris, cannot change international law. 62   
From a methodological point, then, any changes in the customary international law 
of self-defence requires state practice, covering both material and verbal acts related to 
the rule of self-defence, and the belief on behalf of the state that this practice is required 
by the law of self-defence (opinio juris). State practice and opinio juris are two distinct 
elements, both deemed necessary in the legal literature for claiming the evolution of 
self-defence.63 Though straightforward on the face of it, scholars hold different 
opinions about the ways in which verbal and physical state practice on one side, and 
                                                          
60 See, for example, Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate 
Actors’.  
61 Avery Plaw and Joao Franco Reis, ‘The Contemporary Practice of Self- The Contemporary Practice of 
Self-Defense: Evolving Toward the Use of Preeemptive or Preventive Force?’, in Preventive force: Drones, 
targeted killing, and the transformation of contemporary warfare, eds. Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer Ramos (New 
York: New York University Press, 2016), pp. 229-256. 
62 Raphaël van Steenberghe, ‘State practice and the evolution of the law of self-defence, p. 85. 
63 See Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’, p. 96. 
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the legal beliefs of states on the other should be weighed, depending on the kind of 
customary legal theory they defend.64 This common discussion of words versus deeds, 
one author rightly noted, ‘becomes even more complicated when physical acts are only 
partially acknowledged and, therefore, do not necessarily qualify as relevant state 
practice due to their non-public nature’.65 We simply note here that for an act to be 
relevant for the evolution of the customary international law, it has to be publicly 
acknowledged and justified with respect to the law in question, with such a justification 
needing to be shared by other states.  Crucially for our purposes, the evolution of 
international law of self-defence through modification is typically distinguished from 
the interpretation of the meaning of that law. As Tom Ruys explains: 
 
The key criterion [for distinguishing between interpretation and modification] is 
(in)compatibility:… [m]odification can arguably be defined as the situation where the new 
rule cannot be fit in any of the plausible meanings that could be given to the treaty text, nor 
into the special meaning which the parties intended to give to the text at the time of its 
adoption. …Determining whether a situation of incompatibility exists is itself a matter of 
interpretation.66 
 
It has been suggested that changes in the law of self-defence – relating to both the 
status of the attacker and the conditions for the exercise of the right of self-defence – 
may be considered as a matter of interpretation rather than modification.67 Indeed, 
there seems to be an agreement among legal scholars that state practice has been highly 
                                                          
64 For a good overview see, Marie Aronsson, ‘Remote Law-Making?, pp. 290-293; Raphaël van 
Steenberghe, ‘State practice and the evolution of the law of self-defence, pp. 83-87. 
65 Aronsson, ‘Remote Law-Making?, pp. 289-290. 
66 Ruys, cited in, Steenberghe, ‘The Law of Self-Defence’, pp. 63. 
67 Raphaël van Steenberghe, ‘State practice and the evolution of the law of self-defence, pp. 92-93.  
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relevant for the interpretation of the law of self-defence. 68  The legal basis cited for this 
can be found in Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which 
stipulates that ‘subsequent practice in  the application  of  the treaty’ affects its 
interpretation.  
Here is where our approach enters the picture. While legal scholars have 
engaged in methodological discussions about the requirements for the modification of 
the law of self-defence, little has been said about the processes of the (re)interpretation 
of this law. We suggest that interdisciplinary approach that takes into account 
constructivist International Relations scholarship on norms can help to address this 
issue. As we will show below, there exists a wealth of excellent work on international 
norm dynamics that shares a number of concerns that are central to the interpretation 
of international law. This scholarship not only provides lawyers with a methodological 
toolkit for identifying different meanings of the law of self-defence (or any law for that 
matter), but also offers some explanations for why states put forward certain 
interpretations. To be sure, as the above considerations should have made clear, we do 
not intend to make any claims about the modification of the law of self-defence. 
Instead, we seek to show the processes through which the interpretation of that law 
has evolved, and investigate whether a particular interpretation has become dominant, 
how states approach such interpretation, and whether it is guiding their practice 
and/or informing their opinio juris.   
 
                                                          
68 Ibid.; see also, Joerg Kammerhofer, ‘The Resilience of the Restrictive Rules on Self-Defence’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, ed. Marc Weller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), p. 646. 
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Norms, interpretation, and the meaning(s) of self-defence  
 
IR constructivists typically proceed from the fundamental assumption that under the 
conditions of international anarchy, norms depend on social recognition in order to be 
effective. As two leading IR norm scholars put it, ‘in contexts beyond the state, norm 
acceptance and, more specifically, compliance with norms depend more decisively on 
shared recognition of norms than on their formal validity.’69 Here, they point to the 
socially constructed nature of norms. Rather than formal prescriptions for behaviour, 
Antje Wiener depicts norms as intersubjective ‘structures of meaning-in-use’, which act 
as reference frames for understanding the world and shape the means and ends of 
social interaction.70 The meaning-in-use concept is essentially designed to capture 
diverging interpretations by looking at how actors enact a specific norm in a given 
context, which, in turn, will reveal something about its meaning. The concept is 
particularly useful for making changes in the interpretation of international law 
accountable, because it relates instances of its interpretation to the enactment of a 
specific norm meaning. As Wiener explains: 
[…] actors operate within a context that is structured by the interplay between structures of 
meaning-in-use and individuals enacting of that meaning. The latter hold associative 
connotations which become recognisable through interaction and characterise rule following 
on the basis of individual perception of norms. The interpretation of norms is therefore 
individually enacted yet not purely based on sentiment.71  
 
                                                          
69 Antje Wiener and Uwe Puetter, ‘The Quality of Norms is What Actors Make of It: Critical Constructivist 
Research on Norms’, Journal of International Law and International Relations Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, p. 4.  
70 Wiener, ‘Enacting meaning-in-use’, p. 176. See also Nicola Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, Intervention and 
Norm Contestation: China’s Stance on Darfur in the UN Security Council,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 41, No. 
3, 2010, 324.  
71 Ibid., p. 178. 
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For constructivists, it thus lies in the very nature of international norms that they are 
ambiguous rather than clearly shaped, allowing for a variety of interpretations. Of 
course, codification might help to achieve greater precision and clarity regarding the 
meaning of a norm and the character of obligation attached to it. Yet shared 
international practice is likely to be critical to norm acceptance, since the degree of 
coherent interpretation is largely shaped by the discursive practices actors share. In 
this sense, shared practice teaches actors to understand and read the social and cultural 
background against which specific legal rules are interpreted. The institutional point is 
well made by Andrew Hurrell,72 who emphasizes the organizing, rather than norm 
setting, function of the international legal order: ‘the integrity of law sets limits to the 
range and influence of eligible principles, and to the range of legitimate 
interpretations’. 
This raises some important questions about the relationship between social and 
legal norms, and how we deploy the term ‘norm’ in our research, respectively. It is not 
the purpose of this article to engage in a discussion about the definition of norms, but a 
reasonably grounded understanding of what we mean when referring to the norm (as 
opposed to the law) of self-defence is important for our subsequent discussion. At the 
most general level, we follow the widespread view that refers to norms as standards of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.73 In that we focus on the norm 
                                                          
72 Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2007), p. 144. For a similar argument, see Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy 
Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and 
Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, chapter 
6.  
73 See for example Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Adie Klotz, ‘Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial 
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of self-defence, understood as a rule of international law, we are principally interested 
in changes in the interpretation of legal norms and the social practices that give 
meaning to it. The underlying assumption here is that law does not simply spring from 
a normative vacuum; it emerges from of pre-existing social and communicative 
practices, values and interests that are transformed into legal rules. On this view, there 
is no radical discontinuity between law and other forms of normativity. Moreover, as 
Brunne and Toope argue, legal rules are part of a ‘normative continuum that bridges 
from predictable patterns of practice of interaction to legally required behaviour.’ 74  
The hardening of norm into rules through treaty or custom is part of a wider social 
process in which members of international society negotiate the content, meaning and 
purpose of legal rules. The point is well made by Philip Allott: ‘A treaty is not the end 
of a process, but the beginning of another process. And so is legislation. The treaty and 
the law become a datum in the general social process, but it is a datum with a life of its 
own.’75  
In assuming that social and communicative practice has implications for the 
evolution of the international law of self-defence, we connect to a number of 
international lawyers who have recently begun to theoretically explore how legal 
interpretations shape and create legal norms.76 Looking beyond the traditional, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa’, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1995, pp. 451-
78; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1989, pp.  887-917.  
74 Jutta Brunne and Stephen Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional 
Theory of Law’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2000, p. 68.  
75 Philip Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
1999, p. 843.  
76 See for example, Andrea Binachi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor, Interpretation in International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On 
Semantic Change and Normative Twists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012);  
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positivist sources for norm creation, they turn towards the ‘jurisgenerative process of 
legal interpretation’, stressing features of practice, its actors and their reasoning.77 This 
move is predicated on the view that the meaning of a norm does not reside (only) 
within an international treaty or legal document, ready to be deduced by legal and 
political agents. Instead, legal documents serve as reference points, with their concrete 
meaning depending on, and emerging from, social practice and continued 
(re)interpretation.78 This helps to further establish the significance of societal and 
communicative practice for understanding the way in which (legal) norms evolve.  
With these considerations in place, we are now in a position to formulate the 
concrete elements of our research design that will guide our empirical analysis. 
Building on the work of Wiener and other constructivists, we conceptualize the norm 
of ‘self-defence’ as a dynamic structure of meaning-in-use. Following, Ruys,79 we 
assume that, traditionally, states have invoked at least four different meanings of the 
norm of self-defence:  
 
Reactive Self-defence: a claim to have the right to use unilateral high levels of 
violence when an armed attack has occurred - this is essentially Article 51 of the 
Charter.  
Interceptive Self-defence: a claim to have the right to use high levels of violence 
in order to stop or counter an ongoing attack 
Preemptive Self-defence: a claim to have the right to use unilateral high levels of 
violence when faced with a palpable and immediate threat  
                                                          
77 Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law, p. 10. See also, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to 
Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1989);   
78 Ibid., p. 5-6. 
79 Ruys, ‘Armed Attack,’ pp. 253-255. 
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Preventive Self-defence: a claim to have the right to use unilateral high levels of 
violence to stop a conjectural and contingent threat of the possibility of an attack 
from transforming into an immediate threat. 
 
These different meanings are essentially based on a temporal distinction in that each 
category represents a point on a spectrum, with reactive self-defence, which contains 
the strictest requirements on the use of force, and preventive self-defence, containing 
the loosest threshold, marking the opposite ends of the spectrum.80 In this sense stricter 
the temporal requirements, imply higher constraints on the use of force. 
Crucial for our purpose, conceptualizing the norm of self-defence as a structure of 
meaning-in-use opens up analytical space for analysing normative change. Because 
these structures are established and reproduced through social interaction, the norm of 
self-defence is inherently dynamic and contested; as socially constructed phenomena, 
one of these normative structures may achieve some robustness and stability over 
longer periods of time, but it remains inherently flexible.81 To be clear from the outset, 
we do not suggest that discursive interventions relating to the concept of imminence 
are the sole driver of changes in the normative structure regulating the use of force. 
‘Imminence,’ stands alongside ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ in constituting the 
normative structure of self-defence.82 Yet, the developments discussed above and our 
empirical analysis show both a focus on the concept of imminence and an emerging 
                                                          
80 Ruys, ‘Armed Attack,’ 254.  
81 Interestingly, it seems that the most fundamental norms are among the most malleable. Because the 
fundamental constitutional norms of international society, such as state sovereignty, democracy, human 
rights and so forth, tend to be the least precise, they are particularly open to diverging interpretations, 
see Wiener, ‘Enacting meaning-in-use,’ p. 185. 
82 See Christopher Finlay, ‘Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence,’ Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 
18, No. 3, 2010, pp. 287-312. 
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consensus towards a change in its meaning. These have led to an identifiable relaxation 
in the interpretation of the norm of self-defence.    
The IR literature has advanced a number of explanations as to how international 
norms, once established, change, increasingly focusing on the process of norm 
contestation.83 Contessi defines norm contestation as:  
[A]n instance of strategic social construction that aims at undermining or displacing an 
accepted or emerging intersubjective meaning through the formulation by actors of competing 
discursive interventions that challenge the meaning of norms that embody conflictive 
interpretations of values.84 
 
Following this definition, we understand the US’ efforts to promote a more ‘flexible’ 
notion of imminence as strategic instances of discursive intervention within a broader 
project of pushing the normative structures regulating the use of force.  
To be sure, as other authors have pointed out, the US has long been involved in this 
project.85 However, it is only from the point when President Obama took office that the 
US became a rational norm contester. In contrast to its predecessors, who left the 
meaning and extent of imminence more or less unspecified, we show that the Obama 
Administration has engaged in systematic conceptual and rhetorical efforts to develop 
a distinct meaning of the term. This new meaning, we argue, is characterized by the 
inclusion of criteria that are not limited to, the temporal immediacy of the threat, and 
                                                          
83 See for example Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, Intervention and Norm Contestation’; Judith Kelley, 
‘Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring’, International 
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85 According to Erakat, the US has been driving this project since the Cold War.  Erakat, ‘New Imminence 
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reflect the decision-maker’s perspective and priorities.86 These criteria include: 1) the 
inherent right to resort to military force even though no attack has occurred and 
without prior and explicit international authorization (i.e. SC Resolution); 2) the nature 
and immediacy of the threat; 3) the existence of a window of opportunity to act; 4) the 
harm that missing the window would cause; and 5) the likelihood that action now will 
head off alleged future disasters. Our research design thus assumes that evidence for 
adherence to or implicit support for these criteria within a state’s policy and/or rhetoric 
would support the view that it has subscribed to the US’ understanding of 
‘imminence’.  
The key question is how many states would have to adhere to these principles and 
support these practices in order to claim that international society as a whole has 
embraced a new understanding of ‘imminence’. Theoretically speaking, at which point 
do a number of coherent, subjective interpretations become widely shared, 
intersubjective meanings-in-use? Drawing on Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm change 
model,87 we assume that international society has internalized a new structure of 
meaning-in-use when a ‘threshold’ or ‘tipping point’ is reached, at which ‘a critical 
mass of relevant state actors’ have adopted the meaning in question. Although it is 
difficult to a priori determine exactly how many states must support a new structure of 
meaning-in-use to pass the ‘threshold’, there is good reason to state that at least one-
third of the members of international society have to subscribe to the new meaning-in-
                                                          
86 Christian Henderson has recently defined this new understanding of imminence as ‘contextual.’ See 
Christian Henderson, The Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), pp. 299-300. 
87 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 901.  
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use.88 Beyond this quantitative interpretation, two additional ‘qualitative’ 
considerations should be included. First, the type of state that adopts the meaning 
matters. There are certain states whose distinct ‘normative weight’ is not only 
necessary, but also sufficient in order to achieve a substantive normative 
transformation.89 As Finnemore put it,90 when it comes to force, ‘rules (…) are strongly 
if not entirely shaped by the actions of powerful states’ that have the ability to use it, a 
point recently supported by Hurd’s comments that the evolution of international 
norms generally follows the interests of great powers.91 There is no doubt that the US is 
well equipped to successfully contest existing meaning-in-use, and to redefine the 
meaning of the concepts and categories through which international practice is 
interpreted. During the last sixty years, the US has been extremely effective in shaping 
the fundamental norms and institutions of the liberal international order.92 The reason 
for this, as Kegley and Raymond note,93 lies in a historically ‘rare confluence of 
military, economic and cultural power’, which puts the US in a unique position to 
shape the normative architecture of international society. Similarly, the acceptance of 
this new architecture by great powers has important consequences for international 
society as a whole. In this sense, whether the Obama Administration was successful in 
                                                          
88 Finnemore and Sikkink cite a number of empirical studies of international norm diffusion to establish 
the one-third threshold. For example, only in 1997, when the number of states supporting a ban on anti-
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promoting a new understanding of imminence depends on whether a number of 
‘critical’ actors will follow its move.  
This is connected to the second qualitative consideration. It is important, we argue, 
to assess whether states with similar priorities and operating in a similar strategic 
context adopt the same meaning. In this context, it should be explored whether states 
who have developed drone technologies, have/are weaponized/ing drones, and are 
involved in counter-terrorism and kinetic operations against non-state groups have 
adopted this new interpretation. To consider the US’s effort successful, one would 
expect to see states involved in counter-terrorism, moving closer to the US’s view of 
imminence and self-defence. Selecting drone powers and states involved in counter-
terrorism is also in line with the notion of ‘specially affected states,’ whose behaviour is 
important to assess (customary) norm development.94 The next section looks at the 
evolution of the concept of imminence during the Obama Administration. The aim is to 
tease out the changing meaning of the concept of imminence and to make clear the 
current US understanding, before proceeding to assess whether this understanding has 
come to be shared by the international society.  
 
‘Flexible’ imminence and the use of force under Obama 
 
As detailed above, the Bush Administration did not explicitly contribute to the debate 
regarding imminence and - contrary to the call in the 2002 NSS - did not provide an 
understanding of imminence in line with 21st century strategic priorities. More 
                                                          
94 Richard Price, ‘Emerging customary norms and anti-personnel landmines,’ in Christian Reus-Smit (Ed.), 
The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2004). See also Christian Henderson, ‘The 2006 
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generally, the Bush Administration’s contempt and disregard for international law and 
customary international meant that norms were often interpreted as a hindrance to US 
action and as a weapon used by the enemies of the US to weaken the government’s 
position. The power of the President to use force relied not only on the Authorization 
to Use Military Force adopted after 9/11, but also on an assertive view of Presidential 
power and prerogatives. 95 
The administration relied on the same sweeping framework for the targeting of 
individuals and the conduct of drone strikes. To be sure, the number of drone strikes 
during the Bush Administration was limited. Still, the first official High Value Target 
(HVT) drone strike,96 against Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, caused international 
concerns. Asma Jahengir, UN Special Rapporteur, wrote that the killing violated 
international standards of human rights and could set an ‘alarming precedent for 
extrajudicial executions.’97 The US Government refused to comment on the specific 
incident. It argued, however, that a state of war existed between Al-Qaeda and the 
United States as declared by UN Security Council Resolution 1368, NATO, the Rio 
Pact, and the Bush Administration military order no. 1 of November 2001.98  The US, 
then, under International Humanitarian Law, had a right to target Al-Qaeda operatives 
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unless ‘they have surrendered or are otherwise rendered hors de combat.’ 
Furthermore, Al-Qaeda, the government's reply read, was now a ‘multinational 
enterprise’ with a presence in more than 60 countries and its members were 
developing ‘continuing military operations’ against the United States.’99 In other 
words, the US controversially believed itself to be in an international armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda, due to the geographical spread of Al-Qaeda such conflict had no 
geographical boundaries, the US was in its right to strike at will, everywhere and at 
any time. In the context of targeted killings, as much as in the NSS, the concept of 
imminence remained fuzzy at best.  
Upon taking office, the Obama Administration adopted a change of rhetoric that 
seemingly positioned international law at the heart of its foreign policy.100 Members of 
the Administration made clear that one of the main objectives of the new President was 
to abandon the ‘law of 9/11’ and the trade-off typical of the Bush years between 
security and values.101 For the Obama Administration, as several commentators have 
pointed out, this trade-off emerged with particular strength in the context of drone 
strikes and targeted killings.102 Starting in 2010, with the number of drone strikes 
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booming and with criticisms coming from several quarters,103 the Obama 
Administration made a public effort to normalize and legitimize drone strikes.104 In 
such effort, various officials tried to demonstrate the compatibility between drone 
strikes and international law.105 Over time, and especially in its second term, the 
administration seemed to realize the need for increased clarity and transparency. This 
is not to suggest that full transparency on the US drone program was achieved. Public 
speeches and documents, however, make clear that the Administration realized that 
the novelty of drones - and their potential impact on norms surrounding the use of 
force - provided the US with an opportunity to shape norms and policies in this 
sector.106  
The legitimating effort initially centred on the killing of US-born radical cleric 
Anwar al-Awlaki.107 Having seen the evidence on Awlaki, Harold Koh - at the time 
legal advisor to the Department of State - started developing criteria for imminence. 
Koh argued that terrorism posed a ‘continuing and imminent threat’ and that such 
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threat required an ‘elongated’ notion of imminence.108 Koh’s initial effort remained 
within the Administration. Only in September 2011, close to the time of the killing of 
al-Awlaki, John Brennan, counter-terrorism advisor to the President, publicly 
explained the US position. As he argued, outside hot battlefields, questions of self-
defence turned principally on the definition of imminence. According to Brennan, as 
we have seen, the US was finding ‘increasing recognition in the international 
community that a more flexible understanding of imminence might be appropriate.’109  
If at this stage, the Administration’s criteria for what imminence meant were still 
secret, after the killing of Awlaki, the public effort to normalise drone strikes and 
justify them in terms of an ‘imminent threat’ increased. Attorney General Eric Holder 
publicly discussed for the first time the criteria included in the new concept of 
imminence. Holder argued that whether  
 
an individual presents an “imminent threat” incorporates considerations of the relevant 
window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to 
civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the US.110  
 
The development of the Administration’s position on imminence is clear in the so-
called White-Paper, written in November 2011 and leaked to NBC in January 2013. The 
16-page document from the Department of Justice explained the criteria for the 
targeting of US citizens who are also al-Qaeda’s ‘senior operational leaders.’ Stressing 
the obsolescence of a purely temporal interpretation of imminence, the Paper reads that 
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the terrorist threat demands a ‘broader’ notion of imminence.111 Criteria include: the 
existence of a ‘window of opportunity,’ the possibility of reducing collateral damage, 
and the chance to head off future disaster. As should be clear, in the Paper, the 
temporal dimension of imminence leaves space to a ‘belligerent’s priorities’112 and to 
his decisional discretion.   
The administration continued to rely on public statements to redefine imminence. In 
2012, in particular, the administration seemed to realize that its monopoly on drones 
was unlikely to last and that the policies and practices set by the United States were 
likely to influence future drone nations. In April, John Brennan made clear that the US 
government was: 
 
Very mindful that as our nation uses this technology, we are establishing precedents that other 
nations may follow. . . If we want other nations to use these technologies responsibly, we must 
use them responsibly. 
 
At the heart of the principles guiding the targeting of individuals, Brennan added, was 
the imminence of the threat posed by the individual.113  
Obama made a similar point in a crucial speech at National Defense University 
stressing that drones and counter-terrorism will impact on US character and 
reputation. The president assured that the government had finally codified in a 
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‘Presidential Policy Guidance’ criteria for the targeting of individuals.114 According to 
the four criteria, a suspect is targeted if he represents a ‘continuing and imminent 
threat to the American people;’ if no other government is capable of addressing the 
threat effectively; if capture is not feasible; and if there is a near certainty that no 
civilian will be killed or injured.115  
In its second-term the administration continued to develop the concept of 
imminence and the criteria defining it. In 2016, Brian Egan, new Legal Advisor from 
the State Department, argued that imminence played ‘an important role as a matter of 
policy…even when it is not legally required.’ He added that criteria for imminence 
included:  
 
the nature and immediacy of the threat; the probability of an attack; whether the 
anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; the likely 
scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence 
of mitigating action; and the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to 
undertake effective action in self-defence that may be expected to cause less serious 
collateral injury, loss, or damage.116  
 
Our five criteria are clearly identifiable here. The inclusion of the ‘immediacy’ of the 
threat increased the prominence of the temporal element and represented a departure 
from the White Paper which only referred to a window of opportunity. More generally, 
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these criteria seemed to represent an effort to bring the modified concept closer to its 
original (pre-9/11) interpretation in customary international law of imminent as 
temporally immediate.  
These criteria, to be sure, were not completely new. They represented the 
evolution of the Obama Administration’s language and practice, and relied on debates 
and positions developing among international law scholars. Particularly influential in 
this context were the criteria developed by Daniel Bethlehem in a much-debated article 
for the American Journal of International Law.117 In December 2016, the administration 
also published a report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the use of force in 
counter-terrorism. The President’s foreword argued that the codification of this 
framework represented only the latest demonstration of the importance that the 
Administration assigned to adhering ‘to standards - including international legal 
standards - that govern the use of force.’118 The report re-confirmed Egan’s - and by 
extension Bethlehem’s - criteria for imminence.119 As several scholars have argued, 
these series of documents and speeches amounted to ‘opinio juris by the United States 
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on jus ad bellum.’120 Harold Koh has made similar arguments after leaving the Obama 
Administration. As he argued, states and states’ lawyers ‘duty to explain’ their legal 
position was not only relevant for domestic audiences, but also for the development of 
customary international law through state practice and opinio juris.121  
 
Tracing the Diffusion of the Meaning of ‘Imminence’ in 
International Society 
 
The preceding discussion sought to clarify that only under the Obama Administration, 
the US has conducted an open and explicit campaign to redefine imminence and that 
this move can be explained by the need to justify the use of drone strikes as a counter-
terrorism weapon. The novelty of this strategy has led to an uneasy and fluid situation 
regarding the legality and legitimacy of the use of force. In this shift, the administration 
has demonstrated its understanding of the historical precedent being established and, 
as we saw with Brennan’s speech, it has stated that it can count on the support of the 
‘international community’ that has come to share this more ‘flexible’ notion. The 
purpose of the next section is to assess this claim. As mentioned, the section divides the 
‘international society’ into two main blocks: US allies and other drone powers. The 
analysis will rely on two main types of evidence and discourse. It will explore material 
and language produced in interpretive communities. These communities, as Ian 
Johnstone argues, can be divided into the inner circle, which includes government and 
                                                          
120 Aronsson, ‘Remote Law-Making?’ p. 280 and Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin Wittes, Speaking the Law: 
the Obama Administration’s addresses on National Security Law (Washington: Hoover University Press, 
2013), p. 88.  
121 Harold Koh, ‘The Legal Adviser's Duty to Explain,’ The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 41(2016), p. 
190. 
37 
 
intergovernmental officials who come to share language and expectations; and the 
outer circle, an ‘amorphous group of all those regarded as having an expertise in 
international law.’122 Most of the evidence in our analysis will come from the inner 
circle. 
 
US Allies: usual and unusual suspects  
  
Ruys defined the UK, Australia and Israel as ‘the usual suspects’ when it comes to 
supporting the US position on anticipatory self-defence.123 From its early years, Israel 
has given prominence to ‘early warning’ in its strategic doctrine. The aim has always 
been that of pre-empting/preventing an adversary, with no clear distinction made 
between the two options.124 Episodes include the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the 1967 Six 
Days War and the 1981 bombing of the Osirak reactor. In this sense, 9/11 only 
strengthened this pattern, with the Sharon government embracing prevention.125 Israel 
has also pushed for preventive strikes against Iran and has conducted a strike against 
the Syrian nuclear facility al-Kibar in 2007.126 In October 2013, on the anniversary of the 
Yom Kippur War, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed that the key lesson of 
the war was the importance of prevention for Israel’s safety.127 At a high-level 
conference, scholars and former politicians have agreed for the need to include pre-
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emption and prevention in Israel’s military doctrine.128 At the start of the Second 
Intifada, Israel also restarted a policy of targeted killings.129 These killings were both 
‘preemptive’ in alleged ‘ticking bombs’ scenarios and preventive when Israeli forces 
started to target ‘ticking infrastructures.’130  
Drones soon became one of the main weapons in these operations. For the past 40 
years, Israel has been at the forefront in the development and production of drones.131 
Former Israeli officials have hinted that contemporary US technology and targeting 
practices largely rely on Israeli precedents.132 Israeli policy of targeted killing has been 
guided since 2006 by a Supreme Court decision. The case concerned mostly the 
discussion of direct participation in hostilities.133  The Court refused to rule on the 
legality of targeted killings in general and suggested the need for caution and the 
adoption of a case by case approach. As the Court argued the information classifying a 
civilian as a possible target should be ‘reliable, substantial and convincing with regard 
to the risk presented by the terrorist to human life.’134 Furthermore, the killing and the 
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collateral damage should be proportionate, and the strike should be followed by an 
investigation.135 The Court, however, used an expanded notion of proportionality and 
‘direct participation’ in hostilities. In particular, the Court expanded the notion of ‘for 
such time’ suggesting that for civilians who are part of terrorist organization and have 
conducted terrorist activities, ‘rest between hostilities is nothing more than preparation 
for the next hostile act.’136 Through this formulation the Court also abandoned the 
temporal requirements associated with the immediacy of the threat. As Kristen 
Eichensehr has argued, this approach implies that the Israeli military does not have to 
show that the target poses an immediate threat, clearly distancing Israeli norms and 
practices from the Caroline understanding of imminence as immediate.137 The Court has 
also argued that ‘new reality, at times, requires new interpretation’ and that there 
doesn’t seem to be a discrepancy between the interpretation brought forward by the 
Court and customary international law.138 These rulings seem, in other words, to 
constitute opinio juris. Certainly, they have played a part in the Obama administration’s 
memo justifying the killing of Awlaki,139 demonstrating compatibility between the US 
and Israeli views on targeted killings and imminence.  
The situation is more complex when it comes to the UK and Australia. In the UK, 
then Prime Minister Tony Blair was famously a strong supporter of the Bush Doctrine 
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and of pre-emption,140 as was Australian Prime Minister John Howard. In December 
2002, after the Bali Bombing, Howard defended the possibility of striking pre-
emptively.141 Similarly, the Australian Air Force declared that strikes could also take 
the form of ‘preemptive strike, aimed at deterring an aggressor before major conflict 
erupts.’142 The picture, however, is not as clear as the account above suggests.  
Even within the Blair Government, officials demonstrated certain uneasiness 
towards an all-out doctrine of pre-emption/prevention. The 2002 ‘New Chapter’ of the 
Strategic Defence Review suggested the possibility of pre-emption, but only in case of 
‘imminent attack’ and in accordance with international legal obligations.143 At the time 
of the Iraq War, Attorney General Goldsmith wrote in a memo to Blair that ‘some 
degree of imminence’ was necessary to justify pre-emption and explicitly rejected the 
Bush Doctrine of prevention, as outside international law.144 Allegedly, based on this 
memo, the Blair government - like the Bush Administration - justified the war at the 
UN as a response to Saddam’s violations of previous UN Security Council 
resolutions.145 The UK Parliament also made a specific request to redefine the concept 
of ‘imminence’ but suggested caution and strong limits in the application of 
anticipatory self-defence.146 In a similar way, the Australian government qualified 
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some of its early statements, suggesting that pre-emption remained a ‘last resort 
principle.’147  
The UK and Australia have also been among the first allies to take advantage of the 
drone revolution with reconnaissance and targeting missions. The UK has conducted 
flights through its own fleet and ‘embedded’ UK pilots in missions flying US drones.  
The UK conducted 299 drone strikes in Afghanistan between 2008 and July 2013 and 
has been three times more likely to fire a missile than the US.148 The UK government 
repeatedly stated that all UK strikes - even those conducted with US drones - remain 
under British rules of engagement which set a standard more restrictive than that 
required by international humanitarian law and by the proportionality principle.149 An 
increased reliance on drones, however, has been accompanied by a relaxation of the 
criteria for self-defence. A Joint Doctrine note from the UK Ministry of Defence warned 
of this risk in 2011.150 In spite of this warning, a relaxation can clearly be seen. Strikes 
expanded to Libya (where UK pilots have used US drones). The fight against ISIS also 
led to a restart of drone strikes against Iraq and to the diversion of Reaper drones 
previously in Afghanistan to Syria.151 Several authors and politicians have pointed out 
                                                          
147 Reisman and Armstrong, ‘The past and future,’ p. 540. 
148 Alice Ross, ‘UK drones three times more likely than US to fire in Afghanistan,’ The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, 6 September 2013. Available at: <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/09/06/uk-
drones-three-times-more-likely-than-us-to-fire-in-afghanistan/> [Accessed 3 February 2017]. 
149 Birmingham University Policy Commission, ‘The Security Impact of Drones,’ Report, October 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/impact/policy-commissions/remote-
warfare/index.aspx> [Accessed 3 February 2017], p. 44. 
150 UK Ministry of Defence. 2011. The UK Approach to Unmanned Aerial systems. Joint Doctrine Note, 
2/11. 30 March. Available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33711/20110505JDN_21
1_UAS_v2U.pdf> [Accessed 3 February 2017], par. 517. 
151 Chris Cole, ‘Drones in Iraq and Syria,’ Drone Wars UK, 7 November 2014. Available at: 
<http://dronewars.net/2014/11/07/drones-in-iraq-and-syria-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont/> 
[Accessed 3 February 2017]. 
42 
 
the UK’s ‘collusion’ with US targeting practices through the sharing of intelligence. UN 
Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson has stated that the closeness of the US-UK relation 
makes this collusion ‘inevitable’ in strikes outside the ‘hot battlefields.’152  
The UK’s legal position also seems to have evolved. In 2014, Jemima Stratford QC 
provided to the Parliament a legal opinion on GCHQ cooperation with US targeting 
practices. She argued that ‘if the UK government knows that it is transferring data that 
may be used for drone strikes against non-combatants (for example in Yemen or 
Pakistan), that transfer is probably unlawful.’153 Furthermore, she argued that the 
drone strikes carried out in Pakistan and Yemen were not carried out in the context of 
an international armed conflict, that the UK had not adopted the US expanded version 
of ‘anticipatory self-defence’ and that the US interpretation was illegal under 
international law.154 Imminence, the opinion read, applies only in a situation in which 
‘the attacking party must strike or be struck.’155 In this sense, the legal interpretation 
remained aligned with the Caroline criteria.  
As the UK government started to conduct independent drone strikes, however, the 
legal interpretation seemed to shift. In 2015, the UK conducted a targeted killing 
operation in Syrian and, then Prime Minister David Cameron justified the strike on the 
basis of self-defence. Such justification led to criticisms and parliamentary inquiries.156 
In this context, a report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights expanded on the 
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concept of imminence. The report restated the importance that the UK government has 
given to the imminence of the threat and the difference this established with the Bush 
Doctrine. Having established a difference with the Bush Administration’s position, 
however, the report made clear that the UK government had argued in favour of a 
more ‘flexible’ understanding of imminence. The report highlighted the Attorney 
General’s position that in the current context, the Caroline threshold had become too 
dangerous and narrow.157 It also expanded on how several UK officials including the 
Secretary of State for Defence had argued for a more ‘flexible’ understanding of 
imminence more in line with current technology and international circumstances.158 
The report noted that the Government’s understanding of flexible imminence seemed 
to have been implicitly accepted by the UN Security Council in its resolution 2249 
(2015) on the fight against ISIS. The report, however, concluded by cautioning against 
the application of too flexible an understanding of the concept, and requiring the 
government to specify criteria for imminence.159 In January 2017, the UK Attorney 
general, Jeremy Wright, seemingly answered this call in a speech to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. As he told The Guardian, ‘“If we are trying to define 
‘imminence’ in relation to a test that was developed in the 1840s, we are going to 
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struggle...This is about ensuring international law keeps pace with events.’160 
Imminence, he argued, needed an update. In his view, imminence should have been 
adapted to the current circumstances.161 Specifying the UK government criteria for 
action, Wright relied on the criteria devised by Bethlehem. Quoting Bethlehem’s 8th 
principle, Wight stated that ‘the absence of specific evidence of where an attack will 
take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an 
armed attack is imminent.’162 The UK government seems, in other words, to have 
adopted by the position developed by the Obama Administration and the US’s 
position on imminence. 
Australia faces a similar situation. Drones feature prominently in Australia’s 
military and the sector has been spared major budget cuts in 2014.163 Initially, Australia 
rented unarmed Israeli Heron drones for missions in Afghanistan. It soon became 
clear, however, that even these unarmed drones played a key role in the ‘kill chain’ and 
that the targets of strikes did not pose an imminent threat, but were low-level 
‘spotters.’164 Since then, Australian Chief of the Air Force Marshal Geoff Brown has 
described the use of Reaper as ‘attractive’ and the inclusion of armed drones into 
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Australian air forces as ‘inevitable.’165 Drones and unmanned vehicles feature 
prominently in the Australian Air Force’s Plan Jericho, in the 2016 Defense White 
Paper, and in the Air Force Strategy 2017-2027.166 The Australian position on targeting 
and imminence exposes contradictions and positions similar to those of the UK. A 2015 
Senate report stated that Australian intelligence forces are prohibited from conducting 
paramilitary operation and that the inclusion of unmanned platforms in the Australian 
military does not change the need to respect international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.167 Australian forces, however, and, in particular, 
Australian intelligence facilities, such as Pine Gap, are an essential linchpin in US 
targeting. Australia seems to rely on the US notion of imminent threat when it comes to 
providing information for US strikes and might also have contributed to the 
controversial ‘double-tap’ targeting practices.168  
Furthermore, since re-engagement in Iraq in 2014, Australian drones conducted 
approximately 1000 missions, dropping 600 bombs.169 When an American-led drone 
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strike involved an Australian citizen, the government stated that it had not been 
consulted. A senior counter-terrorism source referred to the two victims of the strike as 
‘foot soldiers’ of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).170 More recently, the 
Australian government has clarified its position on imminence and self-defence. In a 
public lecture delivered at the T C Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland, 
Australian Attorney-General, Senator the Hon. George Brandis QC, speaking for the 
Australian Government, discussed the Australian position on imminence. In the 
lecture, Brandis clarified that Australia agrees with the UK government’s position has 
exposed by Wright in his IISS speech. As Brandis argued: ‘imminence is not simply a 
question of timing. The temporal aspect is unquestionably relevant, but it is by no 
means the sole relevant factor.’ Furthermore, Brandis accepted the discussion of 
imminence provided by Bethlehem. He also added that he did not consider such a 
position ‘controversial.’ Finally, going back to Koh’s argument on a ‘duty to explain’ 
and referencing Egan’s speech on ‘legal diplomacy,’ Brandis also stressed the 
importance of states’ practice, of engagement in public legal justification in shaping 
customary international law, and the fluid nature of norms and international law.171  
Australia thus seems to have also fully accepted the understanding of imminence 
developed under Obama and to have aligned its policies and rhetoric to that of the 
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US.172 Both the UK and Australia, then, seem to have strengthened the partnership with 
the US in drone strikes and counter-terrorism and to have adapted their interpretation 
of imminence and self-defence accordingly.  
Other key US allies provide an interesting, more complex picture. In France, the 
government of Jacques Chirac was among the strongest opponents of the Iraq War. 
Still, documents published in the aftermath of 9/11 seemed to suggest the possibility of 
pre-emptive action. ‘Within the framework of prevention and projection-action’ one of 
these documents read, ‘possible pre-emptive action is’ not out of the question.173 
Similarly, in the Livre Blanc ‘La France Face au terrorisme,’ the French government 
suggested the possibility of pre-emption.174 This call, however, specified that such pre-
emptive action was permissible only in case of clear evidence of an imminent threat 
and only within the framework of article 51 of the UN Charter and after authorization 
of the UN Security Council.175 Drones and a renewed focus on counter-terrorism seem 
to have changed France’s approach. At the European level, France has played a key 
role in promoting the European development of drones.176 France has also signed an 
agreement with the UK to strengthen collaboration among the users of the Reaper 
drone. This more private club is in direct competition with the ‘Drone Users Club’ set 
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up by European Defence Ministers.177 After the Paris attacks, as Anthony Dworkin 
argued, the French position became more assertive.178 France has expanded its own 
‘war on terror’ in Africa. At times, France has used a justification of its targeted killing 
operations has ‘exceptional,’ which implies recognition of their illegality under 
international law.179 Recent investigative journalism, however, has suggested that 
France has developed a ‘kill list,’ not unlike that of the United States. France, 
furthermore, has long adopted a policy of targeted killing through its operations 
‘homo’ (for homicide) which have been conducted by French Secret Services and 
special force under several French Presidents since the Algerian War.180 In particular, 
Vincent Nouzille has argued that since the Hollande presidency, French targeted 
killing policies have developed ‘hand in hand’ with those of the United States, 
including the blurring of boundaries between traditional military operations and 
covert action conducted by the French secret services.181 Public statements from French 
authorities have also started to rely on an expansive notion of self-defence to carry out 
strikes in Syria. As Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius put it: 
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As soon as it is established that from Syrian territory, which is not entirely controlled by the 
Syrian government…Daesh forces…are threatening French interests, both outside and inside 
France, it is perfectly legitimate that we defend ourselves.182 
 
The remark seems to follow the line traced by the US and the UK. On the 7th of 
September 2015, President Hollande also made clear that France was starting 
surveillance flights over Syria and that it was ‘ready to strike’ on the basis of the 
information collected. Any strike, Hollande made clear, aimed at preventing future 
attacks against French citizens.183 France, then, seems to have adopted all the markers 
of change we identified, regarding both the nature of the threat, its timing and the need 
to protect from future disasters.  
A revised concept of imminence, Anthony Dworkin has noted, represents the 
likeliest point of contact between the US and European positions.184 The position of 
several European countries on self-defence, drones, and targeted killings has 
progressively moved closer to the US view. Since 2014, countries like the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Belgium have also started to conduct air-strikes in Iraq.185 As Dworkin 
notes, while the legal justification of these strikes relied on the request from the Iraqi 
government, ‘the action appeared motivated at least in part by the ambition of 
suppressing an armed group that posed a direct threat to European citizens,’ making 
the rationale for the attacks not different from that of the US.186 Although this position 
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relies on a UN authorization and, hence, seemingly reject proxy one, in the effort to 
prevent a future threat to European citizens, we can identify the remaining four criteria 
identified above, especially since the nature of ISIS was recognized as particularly 
dangerous.  
 
Other powers: new drones and emulation 
 
Outside of US allies, China enjoys a particular status. China currently appears to be the 
principal global contender when it comes to challenging US predominance. Enabled by 
its rapid economic development, China has engaged in a long process of 
modernization of its strategic and conventional military capabilities.187 Whether China 
will, indeed, ‘rule the world’ one day or become a ‘partial power’ in a multipolar world 
remains to be seen.188 What is already clear, however, is that China’s economic 
strength, military might, and diplomatic influence allow it to significantly shape the 
contemporary global normative order. 
Beijing’s general stance on the use of force has been traditionally determined by its 
strict adherence to the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference. Both 
Chinese human rights discourse and official foreign policy documents have 
continuously stressed sovereignty, non-aggression and territorial integrity without 
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reservations.189 Addressing the UN General Assembly in 2012, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi reinforced this position by stating that ‘[r]espect for each other's 
sovereignty, core interests and choice of social system and development path is a 
fundamental principle guiding state-to-state relations.’190 
All of this would suggest a conservative understanding of self-defence that is in line 
with Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, following China’s decades-long military 
build up, its grand strategy has been slowly moving towards a more offensive and 
inherently more flexible interpretation of self-defence. In 2006, China published a 
defense report that essentially outlines a pro-active military strategy. The document 
explicitly stressed the value of a preemption strategy that allows Beijing to ‘seize the 
initiative’ against a militarily superior power and to create ‘an initial advantage in the 
local balance of forces.’191 As the report suggests, China’s adoption of a preemptive 
strategy is driven by both its ambition to project power beyond the region and to 
respond to regional security threats such as the ‘Taiwan Problem’ and the territorial 
disputes in the South Chinese Sea.  
Beijing’s more offensive security strategy also extends to its anti-terrorism policy. 
Since 9/11, the country has been a strong supporter of the fight against international 
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terrorism, cooperating with both the UN and US on this issue.192 China has its own 
terrorism problem, most notably in the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), 
which lead Chinese officials to declare a willingness to ‘go all out to counter the 
violence.’193 In order to legitimize and support its ‘heavy-handed’ approach to 
countering separatist movements such as ETIM, China has repeatedly tried to align 
itself with the US war on terror.194 Crucially, China has become the second largest 
drone-user behind the US. There are no official figures available on the size and 
technological sophistication of China’s drone fleet, but US security analysts are 
convinced that China’s drone industry is becoming increasingly dominant.195 
According to a US Department of Defense report on China’s military development, a 
‘probable Chinese UAV’ was sighted for the first time in September 2013, conducting 
observational flights over the East China Sea.196 In the same year, Liu Yuejin, the 
director of the Ministry of Public Security, admitted that Chinese law enforcement 
considered the use of ‘an unmanned aircraft to carry 20 kilograms of TNT’ to neutralize 
Naw Kham, a drug kingpin who was accused of murdering 13 Chinese sailors in 
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2011.197 Interestingly, the decision not to conduct a lethal drone strike was, as it seems, 
not based on legal, ethical or temporal considerations. Instead, it was primarily driven 
by China’s desire to publicly display the efficiency of its police and judicial apparatus 
through a public trial and subsequent execution.198 
Beyond this episode, however, Beijing seems prepared to conduct drone strikes 
against suspected terrorists as well as organized crime even outside its territory, 
especially when Chinese nationals are involved. In 2016, China also unveiled publicly 
its first killer drone.199 China could justify drone strikes under a flexible understanding 
of ‘imminent threat of violent attack’ as outlined by the Obama Administration.200  As 
Scott Shane put it: ‘If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt 
minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States 
say?’201 Outside Chinese territory, with its financial interests in Africa expanding, 
China has adopted an increasingly active role in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism 
operations to protect its businesses.202 It rescued its citizens from the war in Yemen and 
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it opened its first foreign military base in Djibouti.203 Overall, as Julian Ku has recently 
argued, claims of acting in self-defence have a long history in China. The Chinese 
government, while critical of US claims of ‘preemptive’ uses of force in the case of Iraq, 
has been much more supportive of US claims of self-defence against al-Qaeda and 
other non-state actors.204  
Russia sees the development of a drone fleet as part of a new strategic military 
approach that is geared towards ‘no-contact-warfare.’205 In 2012, Makhmut Gareev, 
Russia’s leading military theorist, described how the country finds itself in a changed 
threat environment, and that it closely follows trends in Western ‘no contact’ combat 
operations.206 Russia has developed a number of reconnaissance drones, most notably 
the Orlan 10, the Eleron 10 and the Zala 421, which it has deployed in the current 
Ukraine conflict to support Russian insurgents.207 Moscow currently works with a 
number of defence companies to advance the strike capabilities of its current drone 
fleet, but it seems that Russia still lacks technological competencies in sectors such as 
optics and electronic systems.208  
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Like China, Russia traditionally supported a restrained understanding of self-
defence, preferring to handle international crisis through the UN Security Council. 
Moscow was strongly against an un-authorized invasion of Iraq, and it has frequently 
used it permanent seat at the Council to condemn the unilateral use of military force 
outside battlefields by the US. After the War in Afghanistan and Iraq, Moscow insisted 
that any interpretation of self-defence in the context of anti-terrorism must be 
developed within the global legal order and supervised by the UN.209 Yet, similar to 
China, Russia has been slowly moving towards a pre-emptive understanding of self-
defence. Two main reasons have driven Moscow to adopt a more preemptive and 
inevitably more offensive military strategy.  
Firstly and perhaps most importantly, Russia wants to counter separatist 
movements, political and religious extremism and ‘color revolutions’ more effectively. 
During the last fifteen years or so, Moscow has been an advocate of legal reform of the 
norm of self-defence in the context of terrorism, arguing for the right to engage in 
military action to naturalize an immediate or lingering threat.210 The situation in 
Georgia in 2002, in which Russia threatened to launch a pre-emptive attack if the 
Georgian government failed to defeat Chechen separatists, showed that Moscow 
reserved the right to strike preemptively. Three years later, after the hostage crisis in 
Beslan, a senior Russian military official re-emphasized the Kremlin’s preemptive anti-
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terrorism approach, claiming that it was ready to take any action ‘to liquidate terrorist 
bases in any region in the world.’211  
Secondly, Russia sees its right to unilaterally launch preventive strikes as a response 
to developments in US military practice. According to a statement by President Putin, 
‘if, in the practice of international life, the principle of preventive use of force is going 
to be asserted, then Russia reserves the right to act similarly to defend its national 
interest.’212 Indeed, Moscow’s doctrine to act unilaterally in case foreign governments 
are unable or unwilling to counter terrorism within its own borders seems to emulate 
the American targeted killing practice.213  
This would suggest that Russia is open to a ‘flexible’, US-inspired notion of 
imminence. Interestingly though, Putin has openly criticized the US for its extensive 
and unconsidered use of drones: ‘Drones are finding an increasingly wide use all over 
the world, but we are not going to operate them as other countries do. It is not a 
videogame.214 Of course, it remains to be seen how Moscow will actually behave once it 
has fully developed the necessary technology to operate armed drones. Given its 
broader preemptive military posture, warfare strategy and volatile regional security 
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situation, there is good reason to suspect that Russia will eventually emulate US 
practice and move towards a more ‘flexible’ interpretation of imminence with regard to 
targeted killings. Russia and China seem to have adopted at least some of the criteria 
we identified, especially in confrontation with non-state groups, but they have 
remained silent in terms of explicit support.215 
India’s understanding of self-defence is in many respects not too dissimilar from 
that of Russia. Although India’s post-independence military doctrine was inherently 
defensive, characterized by strategic ‘restraint’, various terrorist attacks have led New 
Delhi to assert the right to take preventive action against potential threats.216 After the 
Parliament attack by Pakistan-sponsored Kashmiri militants in 2001, it was clear that 
India abandoned its doctrine of restraint entirely in favour of a ‘pro-active deterrence’ 
with an ‘offensive bias.’217 One year after the attack, Jaswant Singh, the then Indian 
Finance Minister, clarified Mumbai’s position on the right to self-defence, stating that: 
 
Preemption or prevention is inherent in deterrence. Where there is deterrence there is 
preemption. The same thing is there in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Every 
nation has that right. It is not the prerogative of any country. Preemption is the right of any 
nation to prevent injury to itself.218  
 
Indeed, ever since 9/11 and the declaration of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ India has sought to 
frame its conflict with Pakistan in terms of US anti-terrorism policy.  Most strikingly 
perhaps is India’s turnaround on the war in Iraq. India initially opposed Washington’s 
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plan to use force without Security Council Resolution and even refused to send 
peacekeeping troops after the invasion. However, New Delhi was quick to revise its 
position and, instead, embark on what it has termed a ‘middle path’, a policy that 
effectively endorsed the US stance. Supporters of this strategy argued that this move 
would allow the Indian government to open up political space to raise and pursue its 
strategic interests in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.219 Even more importantly, India saw its 
alignment with US security policy and rhetoric as an opportunity to justify potential 
future military actions against its local rival Pakistan. As India’s Foreign Minister Sinha 
made clear, New Delhi ‘derive[s] some satisfaction because I think all those people in 
international community must realize that India has a much better case to go for 
preemptive action against Pakistan than the US in Iraq.’220 In line with its preemptive 
military posture, India is modernizing its special forces, including its irregular and 
unconventional warfare arsenal in order to conduct ‘clandestine’ and ‘irregular’ 
combat operations behind enemy lines.221  
India has also emerged as a regional drone power. The country has been acquiring 
UAVs since the end of the 1990s, but its drone program has gained traction after the 
terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008.222  According to the Times of India, the country is 
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emerging as one of the world’s ‘big time drone operators.’223 Indeed, India has 
introduced over 100 UAVs during the last fifteen years, both Israeli-made and 
domestic. While most of them are designed for reconnaissance, or to detect and destroy 
the enemy’s technological equipment such as radar and satellite systems, India clearly 
sees drones as a key weapon in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts.224 
Reports in 2010 surfaced that the Indian military is bolstering its UAV fleet by 
purchasing a ‘bigger dose’ of attack drones, most notably Israeli Harop drones.225 New 
Delhi has admitted that its armed forces are capable and prepared to conduct targeted 
killings similar to the ones the US undertook in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As the 
former leader of the BJP, India’s largest political party, noted in 2011: ‘India cannot be 
denied the right that the US has, including that of surgical strikes (…). India should 
reserve the right of surgical strikes and hot pursuit against Pakistan irrespective of the 
consequences.’226 Since 2014, Indian authorities have made clear that the government 
has adopted a proactive attitude based on intelligence collection and targeted killings. 
Defence minister Manohar Parrikar has defended the strategy that ‘neutralized’ 110 
terrorists in 2014, pointing out that the strategy has continued.227 In 2015, the Indian 
government purchased drones from Israel. An Indian Army officer involved in the 
defense planning staff defended the purchase at the time by saying: ‘It's risky, but 
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armed UAVs can be used for counter insurgency operations internally as well across 
the borders; sneak attacks on terrorist hideouts in mountainous terrain.’ Drones could 
provide a ‘deep strike capability.’228 In 2016, India carried out strikes against terrorist 
camps across the Line of Control. According to Indian officials, the operation was 
based on credible evidence and was ‘focused to ensure that these terrorists do not 
succeed in endangering lives of citizens in our country’.229  
These operations and their rationale were shared with, and implicitly accepted by, 
the US. There are, thus, clear indications that Indian military strategy and targeted 
killing policies increasingly adopts a ‘flexible’ understanding of ‘imminence.’ Our five 
criteria can be seen in the rhetoric and practice of Indian officials dealing with terrorist 
groups. Crucially, the Indian situation has been affected by developments in Pakistan. 
Pakistan has also become a regional drone power. In 2015, Pakistan was also the first 
country outside the ‘West’ and Israel to conduct a targeted killing through a drone-
strike. The strike was carried out by a Burraq drone, initially developed for surveillance 
purposes but later weaponised, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on an Army-run 
school that killed 150.230 As Michael Boyle has argued, Pakistan has not provided a full 
justification and legitimation for the strike. The strike is part of the government’s 
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counter-terrorism effort. It targeted a ‘high-value target’ and largely follows US 
example and practice.231 
In spite of emerging as a regional drone power, Brazil’s stance on the use of drones 
for targeted killings is quite different from that of China, Russia and India. After 9/11, 
Brazilian President Lula was strongly opposed to the American ‘war on terror’ 
framework. There are signs that Brazil is moving towards a more proactive foreign 
policy. In 2004, President Lula announced Brazil’s largest military deployment since 
World War II in order to head UN Peacekeeping operation in Haiti.232 While Lula was 
careful not to portray this as a new era in Brasilia’s foreign policy posture, Brazil has 
become an active participant in the debate about regulating military intervention.233 
Yet, notwithstanding its increased engagement in multilateral initiatives, Brazil is still 
considered to be ‘the most revisionist of all emerging powers.’234  
Brazil boosts a strong aerospace industry and like many of its Latin American 
neighbours it has become a major player in the drone market.235 Embraer, a Brazilian 
company, for example, is considered by many to be the next main provider of UAVs to 
the region.236 Brazil’s drone program has attracted relatively little international 
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attention, but it has widely dispatched UVAs for surveillance purposes, ranging from 
border surveillance, crowd inspection at the World Cup, and monitoring drug 
trafficking and deforestation.237 In a case not too dissimilar from that of Kham in China, 
Brazilian authorities recently relied on an Israeli Harop drone to arrest a wanted drug 
lord. However, the drone was merely used to track down the suspect.238 Moreover, 
Brazil has so far been highly critical of the American drone programme. In 2013, the 
government criticised US targeting practices in front of the UN, suggesting the need to 
draw a line as to which targets were permissible.239 The country, however, has not 
confronted challenges from terrorist groups. 
 
Reflections: new weapons, new imminence, new norms? 
 
In the following, concluding paragraphs, we will pull together some of the key 
findings of our empirical analysis. In a second step, we also wish to offer a few 
interpretations for why states have adopted a more flexible understanding of 
imminence, and raise a few brief thoughts about the relationship between technology 
and international norm dynamics that the article has implicitly thrown up, but could 
not explore in any depth.    
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One of the key claim of this article has sought to establish is that the Obama 
Administration played an active and prominent role in driving changes in the 
interpretation of norms surrounding the use of force. In its effort to reshape the 
normative content of those norms, the administration has inter alia engaged in a 
systematic and sustained attempt to redefine the understanding of imminence through 
both communicative and actual practice.240 Only under Obama, as William Banks 
summarized, ‘the self-defence justification (…) matured and sharpened (…) to focus on 
the imminence of the continuing threat posed by the target.’241 Indeed, under Obama, 
imminence, a traditional criterion in international law, was re-positioned at the centre 
of self-defence claims and the criteria for the application of the term were expanded. 
This expansion was, initially, broad (in the White Paper), but was brought, at least 
partially, closer to the original, temporal, interpretation enshrined in the Caroline 
criteria in the administration’s latter efforts. This redefined meaning of imminence, and 
the attached claims to self-defence, have been closely followed, and sometimes even 
explicitly embraced by, many of the key actors within the international society. In other 
words, John Brennan’s claim that international society has come to accept this more 
flexible notion is largely supported by the analysis of both US traditional allies and 
other great powers (with the possible exception of Brazil).  
As our study shows, the new, more flexible meaning of imminence can be found in 
the rhetoric, language and practice of several states, though to varying degrees. Some 
countries have accepted the new meaning of imminence as both a matter of state 
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practice and opinio juris; others have started adopting practices without making public 
legitimating claims; while others (Brazil, China and, as far as we know, Russia) have 
not displayed any of these behaviours so far. What emerges from this is a kind of 
continuum, with the US at one extreme and Brazil at the opposite one. Following the 
US, Israel has been at the forefront of pre-emption and prevention. The UK and 
Australia - although initially sceptical of notions of imminence that abandon temporal 
requirements - have largely accepted and collaborated with US targeting policies. The 
UK position on imminence seems now aligned with that of the US. Similarly, the recent 
explanation provided by Australia’s Attorney General conforms to the US position on 
imminence. These four countries (US, UK, Australia, and Israel) provide the clearest 
example of a move towards the re-interpretation of norms surrounding self-defence. In 
particular, the analysis of these countries’ legal positions and of their practices seem to 
provide enough evidence to suggest that they have accepted a new norm of imminence 
– as a matter of both state practice and opinio juris. Another set of countries also seems 
to have accepted the new interpretation of imminence as a matter of practice and 
rhetoric, though without providing clear legal opinions on the matter. France and some 
of its European allies, for example, appear to have abandoned the early opposition to 
pre-emption and prevention and are now trying to ‘catch up’ with the US with regard 
to both technology and strategy. India and Pakistan have also followed US practice and 
relied more heavily on drone technology. Several statements from Indian officials 
signal an acceptance of the necessity of a pre-emptive approach in the current strategic 
environment. Pakistan famously carried out its own targeted killing operation; and 
China is certainly moving towards greater assertiveness in international politics. While 
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Beijing hitherto has not emulated US targeted killing practices, there are clear signs 
that it is ready to do so in the future if such practice is necessary for achieving its 
strategic goals.  
Taken together, contemporary state practice surrounding imminence represent what 
Ian Hurd has called ‘constructive noncompliance’ – a collective legitimation of a 
practice that violates plain language of an existing treaty.242 Methodologically 
speaking, while this is not enough to claim that a new international (customary) law of 
self-defence has emerged, we can see some significant changes in the way states 
interpret the meaning of imminence and an emerging consensus on a modified 
understanding of imminence in the context of the right to use force, which may well 
pave the way for changes in the laws of self-defence in the future.   
Beyond legal analysis, the interesting question, then, is: why have these countries, to 
varying degrees, adopted or supported a more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’? 
Our analysis suggests that three more or less interrelated common factors have 
animated states to adopt or support Obama’s meaning of ‘imminence’. To be sure, we 
do not propose a direct causal relationship between any of these factors and a state’s 
understanding and practice of ‘imminence’ - we doubt whether such a ‘causal theory’ 
of normative change is possible at all, as norm evolution is most likely to be non-linear 
and driven by a wide array of complex, multiple and contingent events. Instead, the 
following factors are the attempt to move from particular cases to a more general 
interpretation of why the meaning of ‘imminence’ is changing. 
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Firstly, states seem to emulate US practice. That is, other countries seem to be 
following US practices or to adopt practices similar to the US on the basis that the US 
government has already done something similar. This is in line with Scharf’s recent 
observation, there are an increasing number of instances in which states have justified 
their own strikes against non-state actors by reference to US practice: i.e. the offensive 
by Turkish forces against PKK bases in northern Iraq in February 2008; the Colombia 
airstrike against a FARC terrorist camp just inside Ecuador’s border in March 2008; or 
the Kenyan incursion into Somalia in response to cross-border attacks by the Al-
Shabaab terrorist group in October 2011.243 Indeed, as the world’s leading power, the 
US is in a unique position to set precedents for normative developments, in particular 
when it comes to warfare and rules pertaining to the physical security of a country.244 
The US’s elevated position within the liberal international order equips it with a 
distinctive normative weight that allows its leaders to significantly influence the 
axiology of the global normative order and the basic parameters for legitimate state 
conduct, respectively. The ability to shape the normative character of the international 
system is ably captured by Kegley and Raymond:  
 
How the United States acts is an enormous influence on the behavior of others. When the 
reigning hegemon promotes a new code of conduct, it alters the normative frame of 
reference for virtually everyone else. In anarchical systems, what the strongest do 
eventually shapes what others do, and when that practice becomes common, it tends to 
take on an aura of obligation.245 
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Secondly, the extent to which states are adopting a more ‘flexible’ understanding of 
imminence is directly related to the level of threat posed by non-state actors. As our 
analysis has shown, countries that have developed assertive counter-terrorism 
strategies have also tended to accept an expanded notion of imminence. This is in line 
with findings on the ‘drone proliferation’ debate that highlight the importance of the 
strategic environment.246 States like Israel, India, and Pakistan whose regional security 
situation is extremely volatile and who have suffered several terrorist attacks during 
the last years are particularly keen to counter security threats pre-emptively. Here, the 
adoption of a flexible understanding of ‘imminence’ is driven by an actor’s strategic 
context and strategic rationale about how to best respond to its security environment.  
Thirdly, there is an increasing willingness to pre-empt future attacks that 
accompanies the diffusion of new technologies of warfare. Russia, India, Pakistan, and 
to a lesser extent China, are confronting separatist movements and (alleged) terrorist 
threats in their territories by using new technologies. Here, the development of security 
strategy, technology and war seem to follow the same pattern. That is, an increased 
security threat emanating from non-state actors is answered through an expansion of 
‘low-intensity’ or ‘non-contact’ conflict coupled with an increased reliance on 
technology and drones, and a more permissive interpretation of the criteria and norms 
surrounding the use of force. Interestingly, even states like Germany and France, 
whose domestic and regional security situation is quite different from that of Russia 
and India, have expanded their UAV capabilities and have adopted less stringent 
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criteria for their use. Overall, there is a tendency that technological progress is driving 
decision makers to adopt more offensive military strategies and with it, a lower 
threshold for the use of force.  
This, then, raises a potentially significant, more general point about norm research 
in bot IR and IL, and the question of what is driving normative developments. As we 
have sought to show, the re-interpretation of ‘imminence’ seems to be strongly driven 
by technological advances. While several scholars have recognized the social and 
cultural nature of technological development, especially in respect to war,247 much less 
attention has been giving to the contribution technology makes to norm development. 
The improvement of technologies for low-level conflict - in which drones play a key 
role - are providing states with an incentive to re-interpret the criteria surrounding the 
use of force and blurring the distinction between zones of peace and zones of war.248 In 
this sense, scholars calling for a clearer framework on drones, and for boundaries to 
their proliferation, are certainly right.249 However, the technological platform itself 
(drones) should not be the only concern when it comes to discussing the evolution of 
norms surrounding (advanced) warfare.  
As Judith Kelley notes, the lifecycle and evolution of ‘norms, as with many other 
social processes, are complex combinations of normative, instrumental, and other 
constraints and causes of action’. 250 As the article sought to show, discussions about the 
normative framework regulating drone warfare should be embedded in a wider 
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discourse about technological progress and the changing character of war and 
battlefields. One of the key questions, in our eyes, is how these technological 
developments are impacting on actors’ interpretation of the meaning attached to norms 
and institutions regulating the use of force in international relations. Here, we have 
found that advances in drone technology led to a re-interpretation of concepts that play 
a leading role in norms regulating the use of force. Interestingly, as other current 
international legal debates show, these re-interpretations have all moved in the 
direction of increased permissiveness, hence leading to a relaxation of the threshold for 
deploying lethal force. Interestingly, however, as the case of Brazil indicates, 
technological advancement and drone capacity seem to be insufficient to explain 
changes in the interpretation of imminence. Instead, the analysis identified changes in 
the interpretation of self-defence only in contexts where advances in weapons 
technology occurred alongside strategic developments relating to the threat stemming 
from terrorist groups and non-state actors (i.e. China, Russia, India, Israel, UK). In any 
case, by establishing a tentative link between technological developments and changes 
in actors’ perceptions and enactments of structures of meaning-in-use, this article can 
serve as a point of departure for constructivists interested in international norm 
evolution and diffusion.  
 
 
 
